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IN RE BUNDLES: FINDING A NEW BASIS FOR
DETERMINING "REASONABLY EQUIVALENT VALUE"
UNDER SECTION 548 OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
William A. Walsh*
INTRODUCTION
Young Laertes, an investment banker in New York City, envisioned a life of
prosperity. His annual salary was impressive for a young professional and the
future seemed to hold only greater promise of advancement. In 1983, ignoring
the advice of his father,1 Laertes borrowed $75,000 from Royal Danish Bank
to purchase a $160,000 home in Elsinore Heights. His fortunes suffered a dra-
matic reversal on October 19, 1987, when the stock market plunged.' One
month after the crash, he was fired from his job.3 Three months later, Laertes
took out a $25,000 second mortgage on his home in an effort to meet expenses
and continue his hunt for new employment. Six months later, unemployed and
broke, Laertes missed his first mortgage payment. The Royal Danish Bank
immediately declared Laertes in default and initiated foreclosure proceedings
against his Elsinore Heights home. Exactly one year after the crash, the house,
now worth $325,000, was sold to a third party through a judicial foreclosure
for $100,000, an amount equivalent to Laertes outstanding debt. The following
morning, Laertes declared bankruptcy." That same day Horatio, his bank-
* Associate, Mudge Rose Guthrie Alexander & Ferdon, New York, New York; J.D., 1989,
University of Minnesota Law School; B.A., 1984, Haverford College.
1. Neither a borrower nor a lender be,
For loan oft loses both itself and friend,
And borrowing dulleth edge of husbandry.
W. SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, Act I, Scene iii, lines 75-78.
2. The Dow Jones industrial average recorded its largest percentage loss on October 19, 1987.
The industrial average dropped 508 points to 1,738.74. This 22.6% loss eliminated an "estimated
$500 billion in equity value from the nation's stock portfolio," and more than doubled the 12.82%
decline recorded on October 28, 1929. N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1987, at 1, col. 6. Big Board Chair-
man, John J. Phelan, Jr., commenting on the loss which involved the trading of over 604 million
shares, said, "It's the nearest thing to a meltdown that I ever want to see." Id. at 34, col. 1.
3. One year after the October 19, 1987 stock market crash, -more than 17,200 people within the
securities industry had been laid off with further employment cuts anticipated. Hinden, Taking
Stock: Investors Are Still Jittery, The Washington Post National Weekly Edition, Oct. 17-23,
1988, at 8.
4. The number of bankruptcy petitions filed or pending has increased dramatically over the past
ten years. At the close of fiscal year 1975, 254,000 bankruptcy petitions had been filed that year
and an additional 202,000 petitions were pending. These figures had more than doubled by the
end of fiscal year 1985 with the 365,000 petitions filed and another 609,000 petitions pending.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEPT. OF COM., Statistical Abstract of the United States 511 (1987).
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ruptcy trustee, filed suit under section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code ("Code")5
to have the sale of the Elsinore Heights home set aside. Horatio asserted that
the purchaser had not given "reasonably equivalent value" 6 for the property.
Attempts under section 548 to set aside the transfer of property7 have posed
a number of problems for bankruptcy courts. Bankruptcy courts have ex-
amined two principal section 548 questions: when the "transfer" occurred,8
and whether the purchaser has provided "reasonably equivalent value" for the
5. II U.S.C. § 548 (1988).
6. II U.S.C. § 548 provides in part:
(a) The trustee may avoid any t. ansfer of an interest of the debtor in property, or any
obligation incurred by the debtor, that was made or incurred on or within one year
before the date of the filing or the petition, if the debtor voluntarily or involuntarily-
(I) made such transfer or incurred such obligation with actual intent to hinder, delay,
or defraud ...or
(2)(A) received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such transfer
or obligation; and
(B)(i) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made or such obligation was
incurred, or became insolvent as a result of such transfer or obligation ....
Id. (emphasis added).
7. The debtor or trustee must clear four different hurdles before she can have the transfer set
aside under § 548. These four requirements are:
(I) the debtor had an interest in the property transferred; (2) the debtor was insolvent
at the time of the transfer or became insolvent as a result of the transfer; (3) the
transfer occurred within one year of the filing of the bankruptcy petition; and (4) the
transfer was for less than a "reasonably equivalent value."
Bundles v. Baker (In re Bundles), 856 F.2d 815, 817 (7th Cir. 1988). Each of these criterion must
be met before the court may void the sale for lack of reasonably equivalent value. See id. at 816.
8. The decision in Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980), opened
the debate over the application of "transfer." In Durrett, the court of appeals determined that
"the transfer of title to the real property of the debtor ... by a trustee on foreclosure of a deed of
trust, to a purchaser at the sale constitutes a 'transfer' by debtor . I..." ld  at 204. This decision
found the transfer to have occurred at the time of the foreclosure sale. Id. The Durrett analysis
was rejected shortly thereafter in Alsop v. Alaska (In re Alsop), 14 Bankr. 982 (Bankr. D. Alaska
1981), ajfd 22 Bankr. 1017 (D. Alaska 1982). The Alsop court first noted that § 548(d)(1) of the
Bankruptcy Code will find that a transfer occurred when it is so far perfected that a bona fide
purchaser could not have obtained an interest superior to that of the transferee. 14 Bankr. at 986.
The court dated the transfer at issue back to the original execution of the deed of trust, reasoning
that no good faith purchaser could have obtained title superior to that of the purchaser at the
foreclosure sale. Id. Consequently, the court found that the transfer occurred when the debtor
executed the deed of trust, a time more than a year before the bankruptcy petition had been filed,
and the conveyance could not be set aside. Id. This latter view was slightly altered in Lawyers
Title Ins. Corp. v. Madrid (In re Madrid), 21 Bankr. 424 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982), aff'd on other
grounds, 725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1984). Here the court of appeals determined that the perfection
of the deed of trust was the sole § 548 transfer. 725 F.2d at 1200-01.
The definition of "transfer" under the Bankruptcy Code is very broad. Section 101(50) defines
transfer as "every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of
disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in property. ... I I U.S.C. § 101(50)
(1988). The expansive scope of the term has been described as a congressional attempt "to facili-
tate the use of a single term that would be applicable to'the bulk of those sections that the
Bankruptcy Act of 1938 adopted ...." Zinman, Houle & Weiss, Fraudulent Transfers Accord-
ing to Alden, Gross and Borowitz: A Tale of Two Circuits, 39 Bus. LAW. 977, 996 (1984).
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property.9 Assessing "reasonably equivalent value" poses substantial difficulty
because the Bankruptcy Code fails to provide a definition. The Seventh Circuit
most recently attempted to provide a definition of this phrase in Bundles v.
Baker (In re Bundles)." The Bundles court did not address the transfer ques-
tion;" instead, it focused on formulating a method for determining reasonably
equivalent value.1 2 The Seventh Circuit, rejecting both existing legal tests for
determining reasonably equivalent value,' 3 decided that reasonable equiva-
lence is fact-specific to each case."' The Bundles court proposed a middle-of-
the-road test,' 5 but its reasoning has flaws and lacks statutory support. Bun-
dles provides little assistance in developing a test for setting the valuation of
property and the expected price in a foreclosure sale.
This Article analyzes the history and case law behind the "reasonably
equivalent value" requirement and proposes an amendment to section 548 of
9. See, e.g., Durrett y. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980) (setting aside
the transfer because payment of 57.7% of property's fair market value was not "reasonably
equivalent value" within meaning of Bankruptcy Act); Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Madrid (In re
Madrid), 21 Bankr. 424 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982) (reversing bankruptcy court's set aside of property
transfer under presumption that consideration received at non-collusive, regularly conducted pub-
lic sale satisfied "reasonably equivalent value" requirement, even though fair market value of
property was considerably greater than the price received), aff'd on other grounds, 725 F.2d 1197
(9th Cir. 1984).
10. 856 F.2d 815 (7th Cir. 1988).
1I. "There is no dispute in this case over whether a foreclosure sale constitutes a 'transfer' for
purposes of § 548(a)." Id. at 817 n.2. The court of appeals went on to suggest that this debate has
been resolved: "We also note that many courts now consider the transfer issue to have been re-
solved definitely by the 1984 Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code . . . in favor of the Durrett
approach." Id.; see also Butler v. Lomas Nettleson Co. (In re Butler), 75 Bankr. 528, 531 n.2
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (stating that "there is no question . . . that the 1984 Amendments to the
Code . . . eliminated reliance on the decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Madrid,
holding that a foreclosure sale was not a 'transfer' "); Note, Can Mortgage Foreclosure Sales
Really Be Fraudulent Conveyances Under § 548(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code?, 22 Hous. L.
REV. 1221, 1242 (1985) [hereinafter Note, Mortgage Foreclosure Sales] (stating that the amend-
ments favored Durrett because the application of § 548 to both voluntary an involuntary transfers
"invalidated Madrid's most compelling support"). The broad scope of the term's definition justi-
fies the court's conclusion.
This Article will not address the transfer question because it does not exist within this fact
scenario, and the author agrees with the view of the Seventh Circuit on the matter.
12. See In re Bundles, 856 F.2d at 819-25.
13. The Bundles court acknowledged that there were two leading cases in this area of the law.
Id. at 819. The first, Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co. (In re Durrett), 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir.
1980), held that reasonably equivalent value would be based upon a percentage of the property's
fair market value. Id. at 204. The Durrett rule has set a requirement of 70% of the fair market
value. See infra notes 37-56 and accompanying text for a discussion of Durrett.
The second, Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Madrid (In re Madrid), 21 Bankr. 424 (Bankr. 9th Cir.
1982), aff'd on other grounds, 725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1984), rejected the Durrett percentage
requirement. Id. at 426-27. Instead, the Madrid court gave a regularly conducted, noncollusive
foreclosure sale a presumption of finality. See infra notes 57-72 and accompanying text for a more
detailed examination of Madrid.
14. In re Bundles, 856 F.2d at 824-25.
15. Id. at 824.
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the Bankruptcy Code to eliminate the conflicting applications of this term.
Part I examines the history and judicial application of section 548. Part II
examines the Seventh Circuit's "reasonably equivalent value" test developed in
In re Bundles and criticizes its results. Part III proposes an equitable statutory
definition describing reasonably equivalent value in terms of the debtor's tax
basis in the property, rather than the property's fair market value. The Article
concludes that the Bundles court erred in establishing a test that will increase
the probability of inconsistent and unpredictable applications of section 548 to
foreclosure sales. The Article proposes a model amendment to section 548 that
will minimize the occurrence of foreclosure sales without chilling the savings
and loan business.
I. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND REASONABLY EQUIVALENT VALUE
The Anglo-American law for setting aside fraudulent conveyances has its
roots in English law dating back as early as 1571.16 Since adopting the English
law, Congress has expanded bankruptcy law to allow debtors and trustees, as
well as creditors, to challenge fraudulent transfers in situations where debtors
fail to receive "fair consideration."'" The enactment of the Bankruptcy Code 8
in 1979 changed the meaning of fair consideration by eliminating the element
of good faith. 9 However, subsequent interpretations of the Code have arrived
at incongruent results.20 Since the Code's enactment, courts have continued to
struggle to find a practical definition of fair consideration.
A. Protecting Lenders' Investments by Prohibiting Fraudulent Conveyances
The initial legal rules against fraudulent conveyances exclusively favored
creditors. The Statute of Elizabeth"' created the foundation for prohibiting
fraudulent conveyances2 2 and for section 548 of the modern-day Bankruptcy
16. Statute of Elizabeth, 1571, 13 Eliz., ch. 5.
17. Bankruptcy Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 1, 52 Stat. 840 (codified at II U.S.C. § 1
(1976)) (repealed 1978).
18. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (1988).
19. Compare Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 67(d), 52 Stat. 840, 877 (1938) (codified at II U.S.C. §
107(d) (1976)) (repealed 1978) (requiring that consideration given for the property or obligation
of a debtor be given in "good faith" in order to be considered "fair") with I I U.S.C. § 548
(a)(2)(A) (1988) (transfer may be set aside if the debtor "received less than a reasonably
equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obligation").
20. Compare Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980) (refusing to
uphold transfer where debtor received 57.7% of fair market value for his property because court
was unable to locate a single case where a transfer for less than 70% of fair market value was
approved) with Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Madrid (In re Madrid), 21 Bankr. 424 (Bankr. 9th
Cir. 1982) (upholding transfer by construing the reasonably equivalent value requirement to mean
the same consideration as received at a non-collusive and regularly conducted foreclosure sale),
af'd on other grounds, 725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1984)
21. Statute of Elizabeth, 1571, 13 Eliz., ch. 5.
22. The Statute of Elizabeth is the direct ancestor of current Anglo-American law in this area.
Laws against fraudulent conveyances, however, have been traced as far back as the Roman Em-
[Vol. 40:175
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Code. 3 The Statute of Elizabeth enabled lenders to set aside property convey-
ances "made by debtors with the specific intent of hindering, delaying, or de-
frauding creditors."2" The difficulties inherent in demonstrating specific intent
required courts to construct "badges of fraud,"2 5 factual circumstances that
illustrated presumed fraudulent conveyances.
The English law of fraudulent conveyance crossed the Atlantic and found
favor with the federal government and various states. From the first codifica-
tion, every federal bankruptcy act contained provisions prohibiting fraudulent
conveyances. 6 Congress specifically incorporated the Statute of Elizabeth in
the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.1 7 The states also adopted the common law provi-
sions against fraudulent conveyance, although with divergent results.2 Conse-
quently, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law
adopted the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act ("UFCA") in 1918.11 For
the most part, the UFCA abandoned the Statute of Elizabeth's subjective test
in favor of an objective test for determining constructive fraud. ° The UFCA
pire. "Under Roman law, a defrauded creditor could bring a tort action known as a 'Paulian
action' to avoid a fraudulent conveyance by an insolvent debtor." M. RADIN, HANDBOOK OF Ro-
MAN LAW 153 (1923). "Where the conveyance was in reckless disregard of creditors' rights, a
Paulian action also could be brought against the bad-faith transferee as an accessory." Zinman,
Houle & Weiss, supra note 8, at 987; see also D. MOORE, A TREATISE ON FRAUDULENT CONVEY-
ANCES AND CREDITORS' REMEDIES AT LAW AND EQUITY (1908) (stating that the Statute of Eliza-
beth was the antecedent to modern bankruptcy law).
23. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1988).
24. Henning, An Analysis of Durrett and Its Impact on Real and Personal Property Foreclo-
sures: Some Proposed Modifications, 63 N.C.L. REV. 257, 260 (1985).
25. "Badges of fraud" were first defined in Twyne's Case, 3 Coke 80b, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (Star
Ch. 1601). English courts allowed a litigant to establish another's intent to defraud by demon-
strating the existence of circumstances which indicated the presence of fraud, such as conveyances
to family members or conveyances by insolvents. Henning, supra note 24, at 260.
26. Zinman, Houle & Weiss, supra note 8, at 989 (citing 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 67.01,
at 15-17 (14th ed. 1967)).
27. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 67e, 30 Stat. 544, 564 (repealed 1978).
28. Henning, supra note 24, at 260 n. 19 (citing the Commissioners' prefatory note, UNIFORM
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT, 7A U.L.A. 427 (1918) and noting that by the turn of the twen-
tieth century this body of law was in a state of confusion and disarray).
29. UNIFORM FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT, 7A U.L.A. 427 (1985) [hereinafter UFCA].
The Commissioners' prefatory note stated:
In most states the bill if enacted will not so much change the law as clearly define
what heretofore has been indefinite. There is, indeed, on a few questions, a sharp
conflict between the law of different jurisdictions .... In the main, however, the great
benefit from the enactment of the Statute will be to remove some confusion of legal
thought, which now renders the law on many points uncertain in all jurisdictions, and
substitute for these uncertain rules both certain and uniform ones.
UFCA, prefatory note, 7A U.L.A. at 428.
30. Note, Mortgage Foreclosure Sales, supra note 11, at 1237. The UFCA did retain one
actual intent provision:
§ 7. Conveyance Made With Intent to Defraud
Every conveyance made and every obligation incurred with actual intent as distin-
guished from intent presumed in law, to hinder, delay, or defraud either present or
future creditors, is fraudulent as to both present and future creditors.
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allowed courts to set aside property conveyances as fraudulent without a dem-
onstration of actual intent in certain situations. In particular, under section 4
of the UFCA, a conveyance was presumed fraudulent if the property transfer
rendered the individual insolvent, or if it was part of a business transaction."'
Congress adopted the language of section 4 of the UFCA, the insolvency
provision, almost verbatim 2 when it amended the Bankruptcy Act with the
Chandler Act of 1938.11 Congress, however, substituted "transfer" for "con-
UFCA, supra note 29, § 7, 7A U.L.A. at 509 (emphasis added).
31. § 4. Conveyance by Insolvent
Every conveyance made and every obligation incurred by a person who is or will be
thereby rendered insolvent is fraudulent as to creditors without regard to his actual
intent if the conveyance is made or the obligation is incurred without a fair
consideration.
Id. § 4, 7A U.L.A. at 474 (emphasis added); see also id. § 5.
Fraudulent intent was also presumed under the UFCA if a person in business made the convey-
ance without fair consideration, such that the business was rendered undercapitalized, Id. § 5, 7A
U.L.A. at 504 (Conveyances by Persons in Business); see also id. § 8, 7A U.L.A. at 576 (Convey-
ance of Partnership Property); id. § 11 7A U.L.A. at 634 (Cases Not Provided For in This Act).
32. Note, Regularly Conducted Non-Collusive Mortgage Foreclosure Sales: Inapplicability of
Section 548(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 261, 267 (1983) [hereinafter
Note, Regularly Conducted Foreclosure Sales]; see also Note, Mortgage Foreclosure Sales,
supra note I1, at 1238 (stating that, except for a few changes, the amendments were an adoption
of the language of section 4 of the UFCA); Henning, supra note 24, at 262 (stating that the
Chandler Act of 1938 incorporated concepts derived from § 4 of the UFCA).
33. Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 67(d), 52 Stat. 840, 877 (1938) (codified at I I U.S.C. § 107(d)
(1976)) (repealed 1978). The relevant portions of section 67(d) provided in part:
d. (I) For the purposes of, and exclusively applicable to, this subdivision d: (a) "Prop-
erty" of a debtor shall include only his nonexempt property; (b) "debt" is any legal
liability, whether matured or unmatured, liquidated or unliquidated, absolute, fixed,
or contingent; (c) "creditor" is a person in whose favor a debt exists; (d) a person is
"insolvent" when the present salable value of his property is less than the amount
required to pay his debts; and to determine whether a partnership is insolvent, there
shall be added to the partnership property the present fair salable value of the sepa-
rate property of each general partner in excess of the amount required to pay his
separate debts, and also the amount realizable on any unpaid subscription to the part-
nership of each limited partner; and (e) consideration given for the property or obliga-
tion of a debtor is "fair" (I) when, in good faith, in exchange and as a fair equivalent
therefor, property is transferred or an antecedent debt is satisfied, or (2) when such
property or obligation is received in good faith to secure a present advance or antece-
dent debt in an amount not disproportionately small as compared with the value of
the property or obligation obtained.
(2) Every transfer made and every obligation incurred by the debtor within one
year prior to the filing of a petition initiating a proceeding under this Act by or
against him is fraudulent (a) as to creditors existing at the time of such transfer or
obligation, if made or incurred without fair consideration by a debtor who is or will be
thereby rendered insolvent, without regard to his actual intent; or (b) as to then ex-
isting creditors and as to other persons who become creditors during the continuance
of a business or transaction, if made or incurred without fair consideration by a
debtor who is engaged or is about to engage in such business or transaction, for which
the property remaining in his hands is unreasonably small capital, without regard to
his actual intent; or (c) as to then existing and future creditors, if made or incurred
without fair consideration by a debtor who intends or believes he will incur debts
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veyance" '34 when it adopted the new Act. Courts could not set aside foreclo-
sure sales under the UFCA, because the UFCA applied only to voluntary con-
veyances.3 5 By rewording the UFCA in the amended Bankruptcy Act,
Congress expanded the range of protected transactions by allowing debtors or
trustees to challenge involuntary, as well as voluntary, transfers as fraudu-
lent." Accordingly, under section 67(d) of the amended Bankruptcy Act, fore-
beyond his ability to pay as they mature; or (d) as to then existing and future credi-
tors, if made or incurred with actual intent as distinguished from intent presumed in
law to hinder, delay, or defraud either existing or future creditors ...
(5) For the purposes of subdivision d, a transfer shall be deemed to have been made
at the time when it becomes so far perfected that no bona fide purchaser from the
debtor could thereafter have acquired any rights in the property so transferred supe-
rior to the rights of the transferee therein, but, if such transfer is not so perfected
prior to the filing of the petition initiating a proceeding under the Act, it shall be
deemed to have been immediately before the filing of such petition.
Id.
The Chandler Act made a number of significant changes to the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and
was fully incorporated into the Bankruptcy Act. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was the first of four
significant federal bankruptcy statutes. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (commonly referred
to as the Bankruptcy Code) replaced the Bankruptcy Act and governs all bankruptcy cases filed
since October 1, 1979. I1 U.S.C. § 548 (Supp. IV 1986). The Bankruptcy Code has been
amended twice since its original passage. Congress has changed the Bankruptcy Code through the
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 ("BAFJA"), Pub. L. No. 98-353,
98 Stat. 333 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.), and the Bankruptcy Judges,
United States Trustees, and Family Farmers Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, 100
Stat. 3088 (codified as amended in scattered sections of II U.S.C.). This Article is only concerned
with, initially, the Bankruptcy Act as amended by the Chandler Act (hereinafter combined as the
Bankruptcy Act) and the Bankruptcy Code. See D. EPSTEIN, J. LANDERS & S. NICKLES, DEBTORS
AND CREDITORS 704 (1987).
34. Compare UFCA § 4 ("Every conveyance made ... is fraudulent as to creditors . . . if...
made without consideration.") (emphasis added) with Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 67(d)(2), 52 Stat.
840, 877 (1938) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(2) (1976)) (repealed 1978) ("[e]very transfer
made . . .") (emphasis added). See also Note, Regularly Conducted Foreclosure Sales, supra
note 32, at 267 ("[Olne significant change was made by the drafters of the Chandler Act: The
word 'conveyance' was replaced with 'transfer.' ") (footnote omitted).
35. The UFCA definition of "conveyance" limited, apparently, the application of the Act.
Note, Mortgage Foreclosure Sales, supra note 11, at 1238. "The history of the law of fraudulent
conveyances [under the UFCA, earlier state statutes or common law], however, suggests that
voluntary action by the debtor is necessary for the conveyance to be voidable." Henning, supra
note 24, at 261 n.27. Professor Henning states that "[t]here is little direct authority supporting
the view that only voluntary conveyances may be avoided under the UFCA[,]" but notes that the
limitation is widely accepted as true. Id. (citing Merriam v. Wimpfheimer, 25 F. Supp. 405
(S.D.N.Y. 1938)).
36. I1 U.S.C. § 1(30) (1976) (repealed 1978), pertinently read:
Transfer shall include the sale and every other and different mode, direct or indirect,
of disposing of or of parting with property or with an interest therein or with the
possession thereof or of fixing a lien upon property or upon an interest therein, abso-
lutely or conditionally, voluntarily or involuntarily, by or without judicial proceedings,
as a conveyance, sale, assignment, payment, or pledge, mortgage, lien, encumbrance,
gift, security, or otherwise ....
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closure sales were potentially voidable as fraudulent transfers.17 In order to
have the conveyance set aside, the trustee had to demonstrate that the debtor
did not receive "fair consideration." 38 The Bankruptcy Act's definition of fair
consideration created a two-part test: first, the debtor must have received a
"fair equivalent," and second, he must have received it in "good faith." 9
In 1978, Congress passed the Bankruptcy Code to replace the former Bank-
ruptcy Act.'0 The Bankruptcy Code changed the definition of fair considera-
tion by eliminating the good faith requirement."' Under section 548 of the
current Code, the trustee or debtor may avoid the transfer if the debtor has
received less than a "reasonably equivalent value."' 2 Since the Code's enact-
ment, courts have grappled with the meaning of "reasonably equivalent
value." Not surprisingly, divergent interpretations have resulted.
B. Durrett: Debtor's and Trustee's Right to Equity
The courts first exercised their ability'3 to set aside a foreclosure sale as a
fraudulent transfer because of a lack of fair consideration in Durrett v. Wash-
ington National Insurance Co." Although Durrett was decided under the
predecessor to the current Bankruptcy Code, the case has had a lasting impact
on the issue of the meaning of reasonably equivalent value. Durrett established
the "Durrett rule."' 6 As interpreted, the rule allows either the trustee or the
debtor to have a conveyance of property set aside unless the property is sold
for at least seventy percent of its fair market value.'6
37. In re Bundles, 856 F.2d 815 (7th Cir. 1988).
38. Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980). Under § 67(d) of the
Bankruptcy Act, fair consideration was received:
(1) when, in good faith, in exchange and as a fair equivalent therefor, property is
transferred or an antecedent debt is satisfied, or (2) when such property or obligation
is received in good faith to secure a present advance or antecedent debt in an amount
not disproportionately small compared with the value of the property or obligation
obtained.
Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 67(d), 52 Stat. 840, 877 (1938) (codified at II U.S.C. § 107(d) (1976))
(repealed 1978).
39. Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 67(d), 52 Stat. 840, 877 (1938) (codified at II U.S.C. § 107(d)
(1976)) (repealed 1978).
40. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, tit. IV, § 401(a), 92 Stat. 2549, 2682
(codified as amended at II U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (1988)).
41. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A) (1988).
42. Id. For the text of the statute, see supra note 6.
43. Simpson, Real Property Foreclosures: The Fallacy of Durrett, 19 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR.
J. 73, 73 (1984); see also Henning, supra note 24, at 265 n.50 and accompanying text (noting
that although several cases preceded Durrett, it was Durrett that "represented a radical departure
from prior law").
44. 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980).
45. See id. at 203; see also supra notes 46-56 and accompanying text for a discussion of subse-
quent law and commentary regarding the' Durrett rule.
46. Durrett, 621 F.2d at 203. It is important to note that Durrett did not specifically establish a
requirement that the proceeds from a foreclosure sale be no less than 70% of the property's fair
market value. The court vacated and remanded after observing that the 57.7% of value received
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The district court in Durrett concluded that a foreclosure sale price of
$115,400 had been fair consideration for property with an estimated $200,000
fair market value. 47 In reversing the lower court, the Fifth Circuit applied
section 67(d) of the Bankruptcy Act, which defined fair consideration.48 The
circuit court concluded that the debtor had not received "fair equivalent"
value for the property.49 In reaching this conclusion the court noted that it
could not locate a single federal case upholding a transaction under section
67(d) where a trustee/debtor received less than seventy percent of the fair
market value in consideration."0
Although the Fifth Circuit did not specifically hold that courts must void
transfers for less than seventy percent of the fair market value of the property,
a number of courts have followed the Durrett rule, even in the face of a
change in the statutory law. 5' The Fifth Circuit reaffirmed Durrett one year
for the property Was less than any amount a court had ever upheld as fair equivalent value. Id. at
203. Subsequent courts, however, have interpreted the case as, establishing a 70% floor. See infra
notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
.47. The circumstances of the case arose from Durrett's default on a note which he executed in
the amount of $180,000 on April 7, 1969, and secured through a deed of trust on his property.
The deed contained a provision for a public sale of the real property in the event of default.
Durrett defaulted on the note and the property was posted for a foreclosure sale on December 13,
1976. Only one individual appeared at the sale on January 4, 1977, and he purchased the property
with a winning bid of $115,400. This bid matched the "exact amount necessary to liquidate the
indebtedness secured by the deed of trust." Durrett, 621 F.2d at 203. This amount represented
57.7 % of the fair market value of the property. Effectively, the debtor/trustee suffered a loss on
the property of more than $84,000. Id. at 202-03.
48. Initially, the court of appeals found that the involuntary disposal of the property at a fore-
closure sale constituted a "transfer" within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act. Id. at 204. The
court of appeals examined the definition of transfer under the Act, I I U.S.C. § 1(30), and found:
The comprehensive character of this definition leads us to conclude that the transfer
of title to the real property of the debtor in possession pursuant to an arrangement
under Chapter XI of the Act, by a trustee on foreclosure of a deed of trust, to a
purchaser at the sale constitutes a "transfer" by debtor in possession within the pur-
view of section 67(d).
Id.
Next, the court determined that § 67(d) covered transfers of possession, as well as transfers of
title. Id. The court acknowledged that the actual transfer of title had been made eight years
previously in the deed of trust, but noted that Durrett retain possession of the property until the
foreclosure. Id. The court reasoned that the Chandler Act contemplated that the surrender of
possession was a type of transfer. Id. (citing I COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, § 1.30 at 130.28(2)(3)
(14th ed. 1967)).
Finally, the court found that § 67(d) applied, because the foreclosure sale had been a transfer
within the past year. Id.
49. Id. at 203.
50. The Durrett court stated it was unable "to locate a decision of any district or appellate
court dealing only with a transfer of real property as the subject of attack under section 67(d) of
the Act, which has approved the transfer for less than 70% of the market value of the property."
Id.
51. By the time the court of appeals had reached its decision, § 548(a) of the Bankruptcy Code
had already replaced § 67(d) of the Bankruptcy Act. See supra note 33.
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later in Abramson v. Lakewood Bank and Trust Co.,52 and bankruptcy courts
in other circuits have followed the holding.5 Most courts adopting the Durrett
rule have done so without extensive examination of the seventy percent price
floor.5 Courts have considered Durrett in nonjudicial foreclosures,55 judicial
foreclosures,56 execution sales,57 and strict foreclosures.5 8 The most significant
52. 647 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. June 1981). This case, like Durrett, was brought under § 67(d) of
the Bankruptcy Act. Though the court held that Durrett was controlling, almost the entire focus
of the opinion was on the transfer question. See id. at 548-49. Abramson also contained the first
challenge to the Durrett rule. In his dissent, Judge Clark argued that the rule clouded the pur-
chaser's title and threatened to further depress foreclosure sale bids. Id. at 549 (Clark, J.,
dissenting).
53. E.g. Coleman v. Home Say. Ass'n (In re Coleman), 21 Bankr. 832, 834 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
1982) (using the 70% benchmark set by Durrett, the court determined that where lienor pur-
chased debtor's homestead for slightly more than 28% of market value the amount paid was less
than reasonably equivalent.value); Wicksham v. United Am. Bank (In re Thompson), 18 Bankr.
67, 70 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982) (determining that where the amount paid for the property repre-
sented 80.8% of the fair market value of the subject property, the price paid was a reasonably
equivalent value); Madrid v. Del Mar Commerce Co. (In re Del Mar Commerce Co.), 10 Bankr.
795, 800 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1981) (concluding that where the purchase price of subject property
was 64 to 67% of the market value of the property, purchase price was not the reasonably
equivalent value of the market appraisal); see also Alden, Gross & Borowitz, Real Property Fore-
closure as a Fraudulent Conveyance: Proposals for Solving the Durrett Problem, 38 Bus. LAW.
1605, 1613-16 (1983) (discussing the application of Durrett's 70% floor in foreclosure sales).
54. For example, in In re Butler, the court merely noted that "[tlhe ratio of mortgage balance
plus taxes and costs to sale price here is lower than both the high figure in Jones and the 57.7
percent figure which the court in Durrett found insufficient." In re Butler, 75 Bankr. 528, 532
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (citing In re Jones, 20 Bankr. 988 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982) and In re
Durrett, 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980)).
55. See, e.g., Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Wheeler (In re Wheeler), 34 Bankr. 818, 821
(N.D. Ala. 1983) ("[A] nonjudicial foreclosure sale which produces less than 70% of the market
value of the foreclosed property is not a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such transfer
and is avoidable under § 548(a)(2)."); Cooper v. Smith (In re Smith), 24 Bankr. 19, 23 (Bankr.
W.D.N.C. 1982) (holding that the percentage of the amount paid' in a nonjudicial foreclosure sale
is one factor to be considered in determining reasonably equivalent value); Gillman v. Preston
Family Inv. Co. (In re Richardson), 23 Bankr. 434, 448 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982) (with respect to a
nonjudicial foreclosure sale, the court interpreted Durrett to mean that reasonable equivalence will
depend on the facts of each case).
56. See, e.g., United Penn Bank v. Dudley (In re Dudley), 38 Bankr. 666, 669-70 (Bankr. M.D.
Pa. 1984) (agreeing with the conclusion in Durrett but refusing to adopt its finding that reasona-
bly equivalent value must be at least 70% of the fair market value); Home Life Ins. Co. v. Jones
(In re Jones), 20 Bankr. 988 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982) (following the Durrett rule, the court con-
cluded that a judicial foreclosure which fails to bring a reasonably equivalent value is voidable).
57. See, e.g., Frank v. Berlin (In re Frank), 39 Bankr. 166, 174-75 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1984)
(considering the Durrett rule as one option in determining whether the debtor received less than
reasonably equivalent value for her share of the equity in her home sold at a sheriffs sale where
the woman received less than 4% of her equity value in the home); Smith v. American Consumer
Fin. Corp. (In re Smith), 21 Bankr. 345, 352 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1982) (citing to Durrett to
support the court's holding that the sale of property worth $19,100 for $1212.77 is a fraudulent
conveyance).
58. See, e.g., Carr v. Demusis (In re Carr), 34 Bankr. 653, 656-57 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1983)
(concluding that a sale must be set aside where a debtor received less than 31 % of equity remain-
ing in the property after the transfer); Berge v. Sweet (In re Berge), 33 Bankr. 642, 649-50
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benefit of Durrett and its progeny occurs in reorganization.cases. 59 The protec-
tion that the Durrett rule provides against a low bid improves a debtor's abil-
ity to reorganize successfully and repay her outstanding debts.60
Support for the Durrett decision, however, was far from unanimous. Com-
mentators found the sudden shift in the Bankruptcy Act's application dis-
turbing and expressed concern about the ramifications of the ruling."1 Critics
argued that Durrett created a de facto federal right of redemption and sug-
gested that the case would chill foreclosure sale bidding.62 These objections
persuaded other courts to reject the seventy percent floor.63
(Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1983) (following Durrett, the court concluded that the strict foreclosure was a
transfer for less than equivalent consideration and therefore voidable); Perdido Bay Country Club
Estates, Inc. v. Equitable Trust Co. (In re Perdido Bay Country Club Estates, Inc.), 23 Bankr. 36,
40 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982) (noting that Durrett was controlling, the court refused to set aside a
transfer where the debtor had received 70% of the fair market value of the property).
59. "The benefits of Durrett are most apparent in reorganization cases. If the debtor can regain
substantial equity in property sold before he files for bankruptcy, his chances of working out a
successful reorganization are increased." Gillman v. Preston Family Inv. Co. (In re Richardson),
23 Bankr. 434, 447 n.19 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982) (quoting Note, Nonjudicial Foreclosure Under
Deed of Trust May Be a Fraudulent Transfer of Bankrupt's Property, 47 Mo. L. REV. 345, 352
(1982)).
60. In re Richardson, 23 Bankr. at 447 n.19.
61. See, e.g., Coppel & Kahn, Defanging Durrett: The Established Law of "Transfer," 100
BANKING L.J. 676, 677 (1983) (theorizing that Durrett and Abramson made it impossible to
"convey clear and marketable title at foreclosure sales"); Simpson, supra note 43, at 73 ("The
rule of Durrett must have sent shock waves throughout the secured lending community.... [T]he
effect, if not intent, of Durrett has been to jeopardize the security of all titles acquired through
foreclosure sales."); Zinman, Houle & Weiss, supra note 8, at 978 (concluding that the Durrett
court "misinterpreted the law of fraudulent transfers and section 67(d)" and indicating that the
decision had disrupted the system of real estate financing); see also In re Abramson, 647 F.2d at
549 (Clark, J., dissenting) (arguing that Durrett is simply wrong in its holding that a foreclosure
sale is a transfer within the meaning of § 67(d)); Alsop v. Alaska (In re Alsop), 22 Bankr. 1017,
1017-18 (D. Alaska 1982) (stating that Durrett and Abramson are inconsistent with the rationale
of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Evans v. Valley West Shopping Center. 567 F.2d 358 (9th Cir.
1978)). But see Gillman v. Preston Family Inv. Co. (In re Richardson), 23 Bankr. 434, 448
(Bankr. D. Utah 1982) (stating that "[w]hile Durrett's application of bankruptcy fraudulent con-
veyance law to a foreclosure sale may have been unprecedented, there is nothing novel in avoiding
transfers under bankruptcy law which are valid under state law").
62. See Note, Regularly Conducted Foreclosure Sales, supra note 32, at 278-80. The twin,
primary concerns are succinctly described in one paragraph in this Note:
The uncertainty of title caused by Durrett may inhibit competitive bidding at foreclo-
sure sales, and as a result, increase the likelihood of deficiency judgments against
debtors. In addition, debtors will be less likely to realize any of the equity in their
property due to the decreased prices received at foreclosure sales.
Id. at 278 (citations omitted).
63. Several courts have elected to follow Durrett on the transfer issue while rejecting its arbi-
trary 70% floor. These courts include: Richard v. Raymond Tempest Kirshenbaum Inv. Co. (In re
Richard), 26 Bankr. 560, 562 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1983); Cooper v. Smith (In re Smith), 24 Bankr. 19,
23 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1982); Gillman v. Preston Family Inv. Co. (In re Richardson), 23 Bankr.
434, 448 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982); Home Life Ins. Co. v. Jones (In re Jones), 20 Bankr. 988, 993-
94 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982).
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C. Madrid: Giving Presumptive Effect of Innocence to Noncollusive
Involuntary Foreclosures
In Lawyers Title Insurance Corp. v. Madrid (In re Madrid),4 a case de-
cided under the Bankruptcy Code, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the
Ninth Circuit specifically rejected the Durrett rule.6 In Madrid, a third party
purchaser at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale paid $80,224 for property pur-
chased sixteen months earlier for $290,000.6 The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
reversed the lower court, which had followed Durrett, and voided the sale. 67
The panel held that "the consideration received at a non-collusive, regularly
conducted public sale satisfies the 'reasonably equivalent value' requirement of
[section 548(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code]." 68
The Madrid court distinguished a private transfer from a regularly con-
ducted public sale.6 9 Ignoring the language of section 548(a), 70 and relying
instead on prior state law decisions, the court stated that inadequacy of price,
64. 21 Bankr. 424 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982), aff'd on other grounds, 725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir.
1984) (upholding the sale because the transfer of the home occurred at the time of perfection of
the trust deed, not foreclosure).
65. In re Madrid, 21 Bankr. 424, 426-27 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982) (declining "to follow Durrett's
70% fair market value rule for the reason that a regularly conducted sale, open to all bidders and
all creditors, is itself a safeguard against the evils of private transfers. ), aff'd on other
grounds. 725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1984).
66. In re Madrid, 21 Bankr. at 425. Judith Madrid purchased the home in September 1979.
She paid the seller $125,000 in cash and a $165,000 one-year note secured by a deed of trust. The
cash paid to the seller was gained through a $142,000 note, also secured through a deed of trust,
to Del Mar Commerce Company. This second deed had been reduced to $75,300 by June 1980,
but Madrid made no further payments. By the time of the foreclosure sale, Madrid owed
$175,000 on the first note and $80,224 on the second note. The third party purchaser, Donald
Turney, bid the equivalent of the amount due on the second deed of trust and took the property
subject to the first deed of trust. Turney's bid was between 64 and 67% of the property's fair
market value. Madrid filed a Chapter II bankruptcy case one week after the foreclosure sale. Id.
67. Id. at 426-27.
68. Id. at 425.
69. Id. at 426. While such a distinction may well be justified, it does not establish a ground
upon which the court could reject Durrett. In Durrett, as in Madrid, the property was sold
through a public sale. Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201, 202-03 (5th Cir.
1980). Consequently, Madrid should be considered a sharp break from Durrett, rather than a
factually distinguishable case.
70. The language of the Bankruptcy Code provides in part: "the trustee may avoid any transfer
of an interest of the debtor in property ... if the debtor ... received less than a reasonably
equivalent value in exchange for such transfer ...and ...was insolvent on the date that such
transfer was made or ... became insolvent as a result of such transfer. ... I I U.S.C. § 548(a)
(1988). One of three additional criteria must be met before the trustee can set aside a transfer for
lack of reasonably equivalent value: (I) the debtor must be insolvent at the time of the transfer, or
(2) be engaged in or about to engage in a business or transaction for which the property retained
by the debtor was unreasonably small capital, or (3) the debtor must have intended to or believed
that he would incur debts beyond the debtor's ability to satisfy those debts. Id. § 548(a)(2)(B)(i)-
(iii) (1988). However, these requirements are merely procedural and the first criterion will be met
in all cases involving a foreclosure sale of real property.
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alone, was insufficient grounds for avoiding a foreclosure sale.7" The court
added that "there must be in addition proof of some element of fraud, unfair-
ness, or oppression as accounts for and brings about the inadequacy of
price.'172 The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel found that a public, noncollusive
sale safeguarded against any of these evils 73 and established an "irrebuttable
presumption of reasonableness" 74 for any bid made at such a sale.
The "Madrid presumption" has received legislative and judicial support.
The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act ("UFTA") specifically adopted Ma-
drid's irrebuttable presumption. 5 UFTA section 3(b) represents a rejection of
71. In re Madrid, 21 Bankr. at 427 (citing Golden v. Tomiyasu, 79 Nev. 503, 387 P.2d 989
(1963)).
72. Id. (quoting Oiler v. Sonoma County Land Title Co., 137 Cal. App. 2d 633, 635, 290 P.2d
880, 882 (1955)). The Madrid court required "some element of fraud," and thus, reintroduced
the good faith requirement that the drafters had abandoned in § 548 of the Bankruptcy Code. The
court gave a regularly conducted noncollusive foreclosure a presumption of innocence. Id. Accord-
ing to the Madrid court, a debtor's demonstration of some indication of fraud or "bad faith" is the
only way to overcome this presumption and set aside the transfer. Id.
Any good faith requirement is at odds with § 548. The shift in statutory language from "fair
consideration" to "reasonably equivalent value" represented congressional movement from a sub-
jective to an objective test. See Chandler Act, ch. 575 § 67(d)(2), 52 Stat. 840, 877 (1938) (codi-
fied at II U.S.C. § 107(d)(2) (1976)) (repealed 1978). Section 67 of the Bankruptcy Act specifi-
cally defined fair consideration in relation to good faith, requiring the latter to find the former.
Congress deleted this language in the passage of the Bankruptcy Code and no similar language
exists in § 548. For the text of § 548, see supra note 6.
73. Guided by its illusionary distinction between private transfers and regularly conducted pub-
lic sales, the court stated: "We decline to follow Durrett's 70% fair market value rule for the
reason that a regularly conducted sale, open to all bidders and all creditors, is itself a safeguard
against the evils of private transfers to relatives and favorites." In re Madrid, 21 Bankr. at 426-27.
This focus upon sales to "relatives and favorites" is a throwback to the Elizabethan laws of fraud-
ulent conveyance and fails to recognize the expanded definition of transfer found in the Bank-
ruptcy Code. See supra notes 16-42 and accompanying text.
74. See In re Madrid, 21 Bankr. at 428 (Volinn, J., dissenting). Judge Volinn detailed the risk
and error of the majority's opinion:
The majority, however, endows the consideration received at a non-collusive regularly
conducted non-judicial foreclosure sale, with a conclusive or irrebuttable presumption
of reasonableness. Functionally, the only way to question a fraudulent transfer under
§ 548 is to examine the adequacy of the consideration. If one is precluded from test-
ing the transaction on the basis of the fraudulent transfer criterion and is deflected to
criteria relating to questioning the validity of a deed of trust foreclosure, that is, collu-
sion or irregular conduct, then the majority's logic in applying § 548 as a factor in its
decision is illusory.
Id. As the dissent indicates, § 548(a)(2)(A) provides a trustee or debtor the only real means to
challenge an involuntary foreclosure sale. See II U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A) (1988). The majority's
argument undermines this subparagraph, and, therefore, the entire section as applied to such
cases. The majority opinion creates an unassailable presumption favoring most foreclosure sale
prices.
75. UNIFORM FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT, 7A U.L.A. 639 (1985) [hereinafter UFTA]. Sec-
tion 3(b) of the UFTA specifically defines the bid at a public sale as a reasonably equivalent
value:
[A] person gives a reasonably equivalent value if the person acquires an interest of
the debtor in an asset pursuant to a regularly conducted, noncollusive foreclosure sale
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Durrett's seventy percent rule. 6 Each state that has adopted the UFTA has
constructed state law that prohibits a debtor or trustee from challenging the
successful bid at a regularly conducted, noncollusive foreclosure sale on a
claim of inadequate value.17 In 1983, Congress introduced legislation to amend
section 548 of the Code and to codify the Madrid presumption.78 The Senate,
however, dropped the proposed amendment and never voted on the bill. Al-
though several federal courts have adopted the Madrid presumption, 9 others
have expressly rejected the Madrid holding.8" As the following section dis-
or execution of a power of sale for the acquisition or disposition of the interest of the
debtor upon default under a mortgage, deed of trust, or security agreement.
Id. § 3(b).
76. The section does not completely block the application of Durrett in the states which have
adopted the UFTA:
This provision would not affect transfers such as strict foreclosure, the taking of a
deed in lieu of foreclosure, or termination of a lease in with the property's value is not
tested by sale. Section 8(g) of the UFTA, however, would prevent Durrett's applica-
tion to lease terminations or non-sale dispositions under the Uniform Commercial
Code by specifically providing as a defense that such transfers are not voidable.
Henning, supra note 24, at 258 n.9.
77. Eighteen states have adopted the UFTA: Arkansas, ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 4-59-201 to -213
(Supp. vol. 2 1987); California, CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 3439 to 3439.12 (West Supp. 1989); Florida
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 726.01-.112 (West 1988); Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 651c-1 to 651-10
(1985); Idaho, IDAHO CODE §§ 55-910 to -921 (1988); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 §§
3571-3582 (Supp. 1988); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. §§ 513.41-.51 (1988); Nevada, NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 112.140-.250 (Michie Supp. 1987); New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
545-A:l to -A:12 (Supp. 1988); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 13-02.1-01 to -10 (Supp.
1989); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 112-123 (West 1987); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. §§
95.200-310 (Supp. 1988); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 6-16-1 to -12 (Supp. 1988); South
Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 54-8A-1 to -12 (Supp. 1988); Texas, TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. §§ 24.001-.013 (Vernon 1987); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE §§ 19.40.011-.901
(Supp. 1989); West Virginia, W. VA. ,CODE §§ 40-IA-I to -12 (Supp. 1988); and Wisconsin, Wis.
STAT. ANN. §§ 242.01-.11 (West Supp. 1988).
78. The proposed amendment to § 548 provided:
A secured party or third party purchaser who obtains title to an interest of the debtor
in property pursuant to a good faith pre-petition foreclosure, power of sale, or other
proceeding or provision of non-bankruptcy law permitting or providing for the realiza-
tion of security upon default of the borrower under a mortgage, deed of trust, or other
security agreement takes for reasonably equivalent value within the meaning of this
section.
S. 445, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 360, 129 CONG. REC. 5972 (1983).
79. See, e.g., Verna v. Dorman (In re Verna), 58 Bankr. 246, 251-52 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986)
(finding the Madrid court's reasoning persuasive in construing the proper test for determining
when a conveyance is fraudulent); Strauser v. Veterans Admin. (In re Strauser), 40 Bankr. 868,
870 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984) (agreeing with and following the court's reasoning in Madrid);
Moore v. Gilmore (In re Gilmore), 31 Bankr. 615, 618 (E.D. Wash. 1983) (adopting the Madrid
rule except in situations where a foreclosure sale is oppressive or inequitable).
80. See General Indus., Inc. v. Shea (In re General Indus., Inc.), 79 Bankr. 124, 131 (Bankr.
D. Mass. 1987) (rejecting the Madrid presumption because it assumes that state foreclosure pro-
cedures are designed to attract bidders and to bring the highest price possible for real property
when in reality "[q]uite often the opposite is true"); Gillman v. Preston Family Inv. Co. (In re
Richardson), 23 Bankr. 434, 445-48 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982) (rejecting the Madrid presumption
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cusses, Madrid's critics have focused upon the decision's conflict with congres-
sional intent and its deference to state law.
D. Initial Rejection of Durrett and Madrid and the Problems With
"Reasonably Equivalent Value"
A number of bankruptcy panels have specifically rejected both the Durrett
rule and the Madrid presumption and have adopted an intermediate position
requiring a case-by-case application.81 These courts have rejected Madrid's
interpretation of "reasonably equivalent value," but have refused to hold that
any single percentage of the fair market value represents reasonably
equivalent value for all property. Because section 548 does not define "reason-
ably equivalent value," some courts have concluded that the amount is a ques-
tion of fact, specific to each case.82
Courts adopting this intermediate position have vehemently rejected Ma-
drid's holding that selling the property at a noncollusive, regularly conducted
foreclosure sale, pursuant to state law, ensures that the sale price approxi-
mates the reasonably equivalent value of the property. These courts rejected
Madrid because they concluded that the presumption contradicts the intent
and purpose of the federal statute,8 3 and because the federal law addresses
different grounds for avoidance than many state statutes. 84 Courts critical of
the Madrid presumption also noted that the decision reintroduces a good faith
test8" and places substantial restrictions on the admissibility of evidence rele-
because it proscribes factual inquiry into "reasonable equivalence," it reads good faith into §
548(a)(2), and it gives undue weight to state foreclosure policy).
81. See General Indus., Inc. v. Shea (In re General Indus., Inc.), 79 Bankr. 124, 129-31
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1987) (rejecting Durrett and Madrid); Cooper v. Smith (In re Smith), 24
Bankr. 19, 23 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1982) (rejecting Durrett's 70% cut-off and warning that courts
should be slow to set aside properly conducted foreclosure proceedings); Gillman v. Preston Fam-
ily Inv. Co. (In re Richardson), 23 Bankr. 434, 445-48 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982) (rejecting both
Durrett and Madrid).
82. See Gillman v. Preston Family Inv. Co. (In re Richardson), 23 Bankr. 434, 443 (Bankr. D.
Utah 1982) ("How much the property was worth at the time of the transfer is a material question
of fact because its resolution is an essential predicate to the legal question of reasonable
equivalence.").
83. See Bundles v. Baker (In re Bundles), 856 F.2d 815, 821 (7th Cir. 1988). In rejecting the
Madrid approach, the Bundles court explained that neither the language of § 548 nor its legisla-
tive history supported "an irrebuttable presumption in the case of mortgage foreclosure sales." Id.
84. Unlike a number of state laws, inadequacy of price is a separate ground for setting aside a
sale under the federal Bankruptcy Code. "Section 548(a)(2), however, authorizes disturbance of a
foreclosure sale, which renders the debtor insolvent, for 'mere inadequacy of price' described by
Section 548(a)(2) as 'less than reasonably equivalent value.' " In re Richardson, 23 Bankr. at 447.
In Adwar v. Capgro Leasing Corp. (In re Adwar), 55 Bankr. Ill (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1985), the
court noted, "II U.S.C. § 548 by its clear language, allows avoidance of sales for reasons not
contemplated by many states' laws." Id. at 114. The court then referred to the more restrictive
New York state law, allowing for the avoidance of judicial foreclosures sales only in the cases of
fraud, as a demonstration of the variation in scope. Id.
85. See In re Richardson, 23 Bankr. at 447. Congress removed the good faith requirement that
had been part of § 548's predecessor. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A). The deletion indicates that
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vant to the question of value given in a foreclosure sale.86
Although many courts have specifically rejected Madrid, these courts have
not directly opposed Durrett, choosing instead to redefine that decision. These
courts have acknowledged that Durrett did not explicitly establish a seventy
percent floor.87 While these courts have agreed that the debtor or trustee must
receive some percentage of the fair market value of the property in the foreclo-
sure sale, the courts have rejected the application of a fixed percentage.88 In-
stead, these courts have favored determining the reasonably equivalent value
on a case-by-case basis.89 These courts look beyond the amount paid and con-
sider the transferee's good faith,90 the difference between the amount paid and
the fair market value,91 the percentage of the amount paid to the fair market
value,92 the difference between a wholesale price and the fair market value, 3
and state law considerations. 4
Congress considered the test unnecessary when it substituted "reasonably equivalent value" for
"fair consideration." See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
86. See In re Richardson, 23 Bankr. at 446 (stating that Madrid limited the evidence on rea-
sonably equivalent value to the amount bid at the foreclosure sale).
87. As noted in In re Richardson: "Although Durrett has been so interpreted, Durrett does not
hold that reasonably equivalent value must be 70% or more of fair market value. Durrett held
that on the facts of the case, 57.7% of the fair market value was not a fair equivalent." Gillman
v. Preston Family Inv. Co. (In re Richardson), 23 Bankr. 434, 448 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982) (cita-
tion omitted).
88. Id.
89. "Naturally, reasonable equivalence will depend on the facts of each case. In some cases, no
less than 100% of fair market value may be a reasonable price." Id.
90. See, e.g., Cooper v. Smith (In re Smith), 24 Bankr. 19, 23 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1982). Ar-
guably, the court should not consider this factor because Congress specifically removed it. See
supra note 85.
91. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Hulm (In re Hulm), 45 Bankr. 523 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1984).
The bankruptcy court dismissed the mitigating factors such as the good faith of the purchaser, the
relative difference between the amount paid compared to the fair market value, and the percent-
age of the amount paid that is representative of the fair market value. Id. at 528. The court stated
that "there really are no significant factors in most of the cases except the price paid at the
[foreclosure] sale and the fair market value of the property at the time." Id. Adopting the case-
by-case analysis, the court concluded that reasonably equivalent value for the property would be
the full fair market value. Id. at 529.
In reaching its conclusion, the court stated that it was not convinced that, contrary to the opin-
ion of First Federal's experts, market forces alone could not have caused a devaluation from
$123,000 to $64,443 in just nine months. Id. at 527. The court determined that, due to the pend-
ing foreclosure sale, the property had a fair market value of between $95,000 and $123,000. Id.
Consequently, it fixed the sum of $100,000 to be a close approximation of the fair market value of
the property as of the date of the foreclosure sale. Id.
92. In re Smith, 24 Bankr. at 23.
93. Adwar v. Capgro Leasing Corp. (In re Adwar), 55 Bankr. 111, 113 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1985). The panel stated that "[t]he foreclosure market determines the standard for 'reasonably
equivalent value' of a foreclosure sale," not the property's ap ..raised fair market value. Id. (em-
phasis in original).
94. In re Adwar refers to state-granted redemption periods a.. consideration against setting a
fixed percentage of the fair market value to represent the reasonably equivalent value. Id. at 113-
14. The decision notes that lower foreclosure sale prices generally occur in states with redemption
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The imprecise standards the courts have used in defining fair market
value,95 and the value the purchaser pays at a foreclosure sale underlie the
courts' preference for a case-specific analysis. No single definition of fair mar-
ket value exists9" and each method of appraisal lacks precision. 97 Furthermore,
fair market value might not be appropriate in the foreclosure sale setting. The
common legal definition of fair market value is "[tihe amount at which prop-
erty would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither
being under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having reasonable knowl-
edge of the relevant facts."98 The very nature of a foreclosure sale, however,
insures that there is no willing seller and, frequently, that the buyer is reluc-
tant as well." Additionally, the absence of other aspects of a free market
make it unlikely that the foreclosure sale price will ever represent a fair mar-
ket value. 00
laws, because the purchaser still faces the risk of losing the property during the statutory redemp-
tion period. Id. at 113.
95. As this Article has noted, there is no statutory definition of "reasonably equivalent value"
and no single.judicial definition.
96. The In re Richardson court noted at least five definitions that might be applicable to fair
market value:
Even the apparently simple term "market value," . .. has been used by the courts in
at least five different senses: (1) the price which the property would actually bring if
presently offered for sale, with reasonable time for negotiation, (2) valuation based on
current market prices of substantially similar commodities, (3) hypothetical sale price
as between a willing buyer and a willing seller, (4) cost of replacement through
purchase on the market place, and (5) "justified selling price" or "normal selling
price."
Gillman v. Preston Family Inv. Co. (In re Richardson), 23 Bankr. 434, 442 n.12 (Bankr. D. Utah
1982).
97. Four different categories of forces produce fluctuations in the market value of real prop-
erty. These categories: (i) social ideas and standards; (ii) economic changes and adjustments; (iii)
governmental controls and 'regulations; and (iv) physical and environmental changes, are com-
posed of a number of small components. Each sub-component contributes to the imprecision of a
real estate appraisal.
Social forces include population growth and decline, family size, attitude towards education and
social activities, utility costs and availability, neighborhood aesthetics and other incalculable as-
pects of human nature. Economic forces include natural resources, commercial and industrial
trends, employment availability, local salary levels, local consumer costs, state and local taxes and
other factors that influence purchase power. Zoning laws, building codes, municipal laws (rent
control, special use permits, credit controls, etc.), government funded housing and mortgages and
other governmental regulations affect appraisals. Local climate and topography, mineral re-
sources, public transportation, availability of community and religious services, flood control, soil
conservation and other physical or environmental forces will impact property prices. AM. INST. OF
REAL ESTATE APPRAISERs, THE APPRAISAL OF REAL ESTATE 3-4 (7th ed. 1978).
98. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 537 (5th ed. 1979).
99. In most foreclosure sales, the only bidder in attendance will be the creditor, who, if forced
to, will bid up to the amount of the outstanding debt so that his security interest is covered.
Equally, a third party purchaser seeks to take advantage of the situation and would have a sub-
stantially reduced interest in the property if she had to pay the full market value. Henning, supra
note 24, at 274.
100. See Note, Regularly Conducted Foreclosure Sales, supra note 32, at 274 (observing that
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The problems inherent in determining the value the purchaser pays in rela-
tion to the property mirror the difficulty in defining the anticipated fair market
value. Gillman v. Preston Family Investment Co. (In re Richardson)"'0 identi-
fied four distinct formulas that different courts have employed to determine
the value the purchaser has paid. To determine reasonably equivalent value,
courts have compared "the amount of the senior lien plus the bid to the value
of the property,' 0 02 "the bid to the value of the property,"' 03 "the bid to the
equity remaining in the property after subtracting the pre-sale liens from the
value of the property,"' 04 and "the bid to the equity remaining in the property
after subtracting the post-sale liens from the value of the property." ' 5 Rich-
ardson, advocating the fourth formula, reasoned that accounting for prior liens
most clearly reflects the equity the purchaser receives in the property. 06
II. SEEKING A MIDDLE GROUND FOR DETERMINING VALUE
In an effort to correct the inconsistencies of previous tests, the Seventh Cir-
cuit formulated the Bundles test.'07 The Bundles court advocated a case-by-
case analysis to determine whether the price received at a foreclosure sale was
a reasonable equivalent to the fair market value of the property. 108 However,
in formulating this three-part analysis, the Bundles court failed to address a
number of inherent problems in its implementation.
A. In re Bundles and a Case-by-Case Analysis
The Seventh Circuit in Bundles v. Baker (In re Bundles) °9 became the first
"several factors normally employed to arrive at fair market value, such as reasonable time to find
a purchaser, competition with other similar properties in the open market and the most profitable
use of the property, are absent in the case of a mortgage foreclosure sale") (citations omitted).
101. 23 Bankr. 434 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982).
102. Id. at 441 n.1 I (describing the method employed in Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Madrid
(In re Madrid), 21 Bankr. 424 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982), affd on other grounds. 725 F.2d 1197 (9th
Cir. 1984)).
103. Id. (noting the system used in Smith v. American Consumer Fin. Corp. (In re Smith), 21
Bankr. 345 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1982)).
104. Id. (detailing the formula used in Coleman v. Home Say. Ass'n (In re Coleman), 21
Bankr. 832 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1982)).
105. Id. (reviewing the plaintiff's suggested calculations).
106. Id.
107. Bundles v. Baker (In re Bundles), 856 F.2d 815 (7th Cir. 1988).
108. Id. at 824-25.
109. Id. The circumstances behind this case began when Mr. Donald E. Bundles was unable to
meet his mortgage payments in 1984 and 1985. Id. at 817. On March 4, 1985, Indiana National
Bank ("INB") initiated an action in state court for the purpose of foreclosing on the property. A
default judgment was entered on July 10, 1985, against Mr. Bundles in the amount of $4,696.46.
A federal tax lien against the property for $2,666 was also reduced to a personal judgment against
Mr. Bundles at that time. A sheriff's sale of the property was conducted on September 11, 1985,
in full compliance with state law. A third party purchased the property for $5,066.80. The prop-
erty's fair market value at that time was at least $15,500. The sheriff conveyed the property by
deed to the third party on September 12, 1985, and the next day Mr. Bundles filed a voluntary
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federal appellate court to adopt a definition of reasonably equivalent value
between the Durrett rule and the Madrid presumption. The Bundles court
rejected both a bankruptcy court's general acceptance of Madrid'" and a re-
viewing district court's subsequent restrictive application of that presump-
tion."' Instead, the Seventh Circuit advocated a three part, case-by-case anal-
ysis to determine whether the price received at a foreclosure sale was a
reasonable equivalent to the fair market value of the property. " 2
The Bundles court's analysis initially re-emphasized the federal statutory
right of review of state court decisions on the question of whether reasonably
equivalent value was given. " 3 Reading section 548(a)(2)(A) of the Code liter-
ally, the court found that all foreclosure sales may receive independent federal
review because the statutory language creates no exception for foreclosure
sales conducted in accordance with state law. " The court further reasoned
that state law did not control because Congress had established the federal
guidelines for setting aside a foreclosure sale." 5 With respect to the issue of
the right of review, the Bundles court concluded that the 1984 amendments to
the Bankruptcy Code did not alter these grounds for setting aside a foreclosure
sale.'
petition under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. Id.
110. Bundles v. Baker (In re Bundles), 61 Bankr. 929, 936 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1986) (holding
that "any avoiding effect accorded a low purchase price by section 548(a)(2)(A) is misplaced and
overbroad with respect to regularly conducted, noncollusive foreclosure sales"), affid, 78 Bankr.
203 (S.D. Ind. 1987), rev'd, 856 F.2d 815 (7th Cir. 1988).
Ill. Bundles v. Baker (In re Bundles), 78 Bankr. 203, 210 (S.D. Ind. 1987) (applying an ir-
rebuttable presumption to a regularly conducted, noncollusive foreclosure where the property was
sold to third-party purchaser), rev'd 856 F.2d 815 (7th Cir. 1988).
112. In re Bundles, 856 F.2d at 824.
113. Id. at 821.
114. Id. at 823. The court observed that § 548(a)(2)(A) "makes no distinction between sales
that do and sales that do not comply with state law." Id. at 821. The lack of any limiting lan-
guage permitted the court to conclude that the reviewing court could make an independent review.
Id.
The Seventh Circuit's argument appears weak and relies upon a loose examination of legislative
intent. The court could have strengthened its opinion with a more detailed examination of the
Bankruptcy Code. Section 548 will not apply unless the debtor files for bankruptcy under chapter
7, 11, 12, or 13. II U.S.C. § 103(a) (1988). Not one of these chapters makes any reference to
existing state law in discussing the trustee's responsibility to represent the interest of the debtor.
The absence of a state law reference creates a stronger presumption that the Bankruptcy Code
addresses different interests than state law and that the federal law is independent of state law.
115. The circuit court rejected the district court's application of Butner v. United States, 440
U.S. 48 (1979). In Butner. the Supreme Court held that state law would be applied where the
federal government has not exercised its power to establish laws governing bankruptcies. Id. at 54.
The Bundles court transformed the right of independent federal review into a federal standard
that blocks any deference to state law. Bundles v. Baker (In re Bundles), 856 F.2d 815, 822 (7th
Cir. 1988); see supra note 84 for a more detailed explanation of the reasoning behind the federal
standard.
116. The court examined the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal
Judgeship Act ("BAFJA") and proposed amendments addressing the Durrett issue. See supra
note 33 for a discussion of BAFJA and the proposed amendments. Because these amendments
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In the second portion of its analysis, the Bundles decision strongly rejected
the Madrid presumption." 7 In the court's view, any irrebuttable presumption
given to the foreclosure sale conflicts with section 548(a)" 8 because that stat-
ute fails to provide any exceptions to the trustee's power of avoidance. 1 9 Con-
sequently, the court found all judicially formulated exceptions incompatible
with the statute. 20 The Seventh Circuit also observed that Madrid, contrary
to congressional intent, reintroduced good faith into the foreclosure sale analy-
sis. 12 1 Finally, the court rejected the Madrid presumption, reasoning that it
makes section 548(a)(2) redundant.' 22
Similarly, the Bundles court rejected the Durrett rule in favor of a case-by-
case analysis and focused the final portion of its analysis on what constitutes
were not adopted, the court concluded that "the most reasonable interpretation of the legislative
history is that Congress did not legislate an irrebuttable presumption in the case of mortgage
foreclosure sales." In re Bundles, 856 F.2d at 821. But see. Zinman, Foreclosures as Fraudulent
Transfers, 287 PRACTICING L. INST. 148, 168-71 (1986) (noting that the reason the amendments
were not passed was merely because Senator Metzenbaum (D-OH) requested a Senate Judiciary
Committee review before the amendments were voted upon). Zinman concluded that "[in light of
this legislative history, it would seem reasonable for the courts to construe the changes strictly."
Id. at 171.
117. The Bundles court's rejection directly parallels the reasoning used in Gillman v. Preston
Family Inv. Co. (In re Richardson), 23 Bankr. 434, 446-47 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982). The Seventh
Circuit, however, did not use the fourth Richardson ground for ignoring Madrid. The Richardson
court also believed that Madrid placed too heavy an emphasis on state law. In re Richardson, 23
Bankr. at 447. Richardson found that state law would uphold a foreclosure sale even if reasonable
equivalent value was not given. Id. This contrast with the federal statute caused the Richardson
court to conclude that "[tihe determination of reasonable equivalence should not be controlled by
state law." Id.
118. Bundles v. Baker (In re Bundles), 856 F.2d 815, 823 (7th Cir. 1988) (observing that
"[sluch a reading, in effect, creates an exception to the trustee's avoiding powers under section
548(a)(2)(A)-an exception not otherwise found in the statute-for property sold at a foreclosure
sale"). See supra note 6 (presenting the text of § 548(a)).
119. In re Bundles, 856 F.2d at 823 (citing Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Madrid (In re Madrid),
21 Bankr. 424, 428 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982) (Volinn, J., dissenting), and Gillman v. Preston Family
Inv. Co. (In re Richardson), 23 Bankr. 434, 446 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982)).
120. 856 F.2d at 823. (referring to In re Madrid, 21 Bankr. at 428 (Volinn, J., dissenting)
("[b]y concluding that a regularly conducted sale in the absence of collusion satisfies the 'reasona-
bly equivalent value' test, the majority has excised vital language from § 548 in order to create an
exception to the statute where a forced sale of the debtor's property is involved")).
121. Id. (noting that upholding a foreclosure sale that was conducted in good faith would be
inconsistent with the trustee's statutorily created authority to "avoid transfers as constructively
fraudulent, irrespective of the parties' actual intent"); see also Gillman v. Preston Family Inv. Co.
(In re Richardson), 23 Bankr. 434, 447 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982) (noting that Congress deleted the
good faith test that had been part of § 67 of the Bankruptcy Act).
122. In re Bundles, 856 F.2d at 823. The Bundles court observed that the Bankruptcy Code
already allows for a sale to be set aside where there was an actual intent to defraud under §
548(a)(I) or under § 544(b) where state law permits the avoidance. Id.
The Madrid presumption, however, would restrict a trustee's authority under § 548(a)(2) to
these very same incidents. Due to the convention of statutory construction that Congress never
passes redundant provisions, the Bundles court held that § 548(a)(2) must be an additional, exclu-
sively federal right for setting aside a foreclosure sale. Id.
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"value."'12 The court initially noted the existence of a number of different
definitions for "value" and stated that the definition in section 548(d)(2)(A)
provided little guidance. 2" The varied definitions of value in the Bankruptcy
Code allowed the court to conclude that Congress did not intend to have mar-
ket value serve as the measure of reasonably equivalent value.' 25
In addition, the Bundles court observed that the federal Bankruptcy Code
addresses interests which prohibit full reliance on state law for determining
reasonable equivalence.'2 6 The various interests involved in a foreclosure sale,
concluded the court, require the bankruptcy court to examine all the facts in
each case.'27 The Bundles court also indicated that bankruptcy courts should
consider the Code's interest in preserving the assets of the estate and should
examine the foreclosure transaction in its totality. 28 The court, however, con-
cluded that the effect of the foreclosure sale on the fair market value should be
the primary factor in determining reasonably equivalent value. 29 The Seventh
Circuit added that courts should respect state foreclosure sale proceedings and
placed principal importance on the price received at the foreclosure sale.'
The Bundles court ultimately concluded that "reasonably equivalent value"
was incapable of precise definition.' ' The Seventh Circuit ostensibly came out
in favor of a case-by-case analysis of the critical question of whether reasona-
bly equivalent value was given. Nonetheless, the court of appeals concluded
that the fact-specific determination should always begin with a presumption in
favor of the foreclosure price.
B. No Functional Distinction Exists Between Bundles and Madrid
The Seventh Circuit's decision in In re Bundles contains distinct flaws. Pri-
123. Id. at 824.
124. Id. at 823-24. Section 548(d)(2)(A) defines value as "property, or satisfaction or securing
of a present or antecedent debt of the debtor, but does not include an unperformed promise to
furnish support to the debtor or to a relative of the debtor." I1 U.S.C. § 548(d)(2)(A) (1988).
125. Bundles v. Baker (In re Bundles), 856 F.2d 815, 824 (7th Cir. 1988). "If anything is clear
from the various uses of the word 'value' in the Code, it is that Congress did not mean fair market
value when it used the term reasonably equivalent value." Id. This conclusion, as shall be dis-
cussed below, is flawed because it fails to consider the words modifying value in the section.
126. Id.
127. Id. (citations omitted).
128. Id. (stating that "the bankruptcy court also must examine the foreclosure transaction in
its totality to determine whether the procedures employed were calculated not only to secure for
the mortgage the value of its interest but also to return to the debtor-mortgagor his equity in
property").
129. Id. The court conceded:
As a practical matter, the foreclosure sale price is the only means of measuring the
effect of the foreclosure on the value of the property. Indeed, in usual circumstances,
it would be appropriate to permit a rebuttable presumption that the price obtained at
the foreclosure sale represents reasonably equivalent value.
Id. (emphasis added).
130. Id.
131. See id. at 823-24.
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marily, the new Bundles test will fail to preserve the unique federal interests
that underlie elements of the Bankruptcy Code. Bundles conditions the value
received through a transfer of property on the circumstances surrounding that
transfer and so perpetuates the misapplication of section 548(a)(2)(A).
1. Failure to Preserve the Federal Interests
The federal government has two underlying goals which it seeks to achieve
through the Bankruptcy Code. First, bankruptcy proceedings seek to protect
the insolvent's estate in order to maximize an equitable distribution of as-
sets. 3  Second, this first goal should be met in a swift and economical man-
ner. 3 3 Federal bankruptcy statutes are intentionally more expansive than the
state fraudulent transfer laws in order to facilitate these interests. 34 For ex-
ample, section 548 of the Code provides that a trustee may set aside a foreclo-
sure sale for mere inadequacy of price or lack of reasonably equivalent
value.' 3 These reasons are insufficient under state foreclosure laws. 3
Despite the Seventh Circuit's recognition of the distinct federal interests
under section 548,' 37 it ignored its own insight and implemented a rule that
favors state law. The Bundles court created a rebuttable presumption in favor
of the foreclosure price. 38 The Bundles conditions for rebutting the presump-
tion favoring the foreclosure price reinforce state law and ignore the federal
government's different interests. Most state statutes require proper notice,' 39
public sales,' 40 and other procedural protections as conditions for upholding
the foreclosure sale. Consequently, when a federal bankruptcy court examines
the notice provided and bidding system used, it merely duplicates the analysis
under existing state law.
The last inspection that Bundles specifically requires, the appraisal value,
offers a criterion so ambiguous that it has no substantive value. Because real
132. Simonson v. Granquist, 369 U.S. 38, 40 (1962).
133. See Scovill v. Thayer, 105 U.S. 143, 158 (1881).
134. Note, Mortgage Foreclosure Sales, supra note I1, at 1246.
135. II U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A) (1988).
136. See Gillman v. Preston Family Inv. Co. (In re Richardson), 23 Bankr. 434, 447 (Bankr.
D. Utah 1982).
137. "[W]e must reject the view that state law, either directly or as the federal rule of decision,
should determine the outcome of a bankrupt's complaint under section 548(a)(2)(A). Here, Con-
gress has set forth a federal standard. We must give effect to that congressional will, however
ambiguous its manifestation." Bundles v. Baker (In re Bundles), 856 F.2d 815, 822 (7th Cir.
1988).
138. The court noted that on examination of the notice for the sale, the system and manner of
bidding and appraisal formulas used would be sufficient to protect the federal interests. Id. at 824.
The court, however, only required a "fact-specific" examination. Id. at 825. Bundles further di-
rected "the bankruptcy court to draw upon its expertise in evaluating the economic forces at play
in a specific case." Id.
139. See Note, Regularly Conducted Foreclosure Sales, supra note 32, at 275 & n.97 (noting
that most state procedures include a preliminary title search, service of process, hearings and
public notice of the sale).
140. See id. at 275 & n.98.
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estate appraisal is inexact, courts will consider most ballpark figures to be
fair.141 Despite the Bundles court's opposition to the Madrid presumption, its
alternative test is so deferential both to state law and to the price received at
the foreclosure sale that only rarely will a sale be set aside. 2
Bundles creates a federal test that mimics state law requirements and
removes section 548 from the trustee's arsenal of legal relief. The Bundles
test, consequently, eliminates the trustee's ability to protect the interests of the
debtor's other creditors under section 548. Under Bundles, no substantive dif-
ference exists between the state and federal requirements. As a result, the
federal goals of distributing the estate equitably and swiftly are forsaken.
2. Failure to Correctly Interpret "Reasonably Equivalent Value"
A trustee may set aside any transfer unless the debtor received "reasonably
equivalent value" ' in exchange for his interest in the property. 44 The value
received must be the reasonable equivalent of the debtor's interest in the prop-
erty."4 5 The Bundles court erred in failing to consider "reasonably equivalent
value" independent of the form of transfer. 46 Any attempt to define the value
given within terms of the transfer is inconsistent with the plain meaning of
section 548(a)(2)(A). Bundles perpetuates the conflict between Durrett and
Madrid because the court continues to determine the reasonableness of the
value in relation to the circumstances of the transfer.
The Bundles court focused on what value, given that the sale occurs through
an involuntary foreclosure sale, would represent a reasonable equivalence. The
court concluded that the foreclosure sale price is the only "practical" means
141. The Seventh Circuit implied that the determination of a fair appraisal price will be left to
the bankruptcy judge's own knowledge. In re Bundles, 856 F.2d at 825 ("[lit will require the
bankruptcy court to draw upon its expertise in evaluating the economic forces at play in a specific
case."). Unless the appraisal shocks the judge's conscience, the evaluation will likely be upheld.
142. The sales, though regularly conducted, to be avoided under this new test would be those
that "shocked the conscience" of the judge. However, such sales can already be set aside under
state law. Id. at 822 n.10 (citing Fletcher v. McGill, 110 Ind. 395, 10 N.E. 651, 654 (1887)).
Consequently, the effect of Bundles is to make § 548(a)(2)(A) duplicative of § 544(b), which
allows a sale to be set aside where state law so permits. See II U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(2)(A), 544(b)
(1988). This is a result the Bundles court rejected during its examination of Madrid. In re Bun-
dles, 856 F.2d at 823.
143. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A) (1988).
144. It is important to note that the statute places this requirement on what was transferred,
not on how the transfer was conducted. II U.S.C. § 548(a) (1988). Reasonable equivalence must
be given for the debtor's interest in the property. Whether the transfer was voluntary or involun-
tary does not affect the debtor's interest, nor does it restrict the trustee's ability to act. Conse-
quently, the fact that the transfer occurred in a foreclosure sale should not affect the determina-
tion of reasonably equivalent value.
145. See id.
146. See Bundles v. Baker (In re Bundles), 856 F.2d 815, 824 (7th Cir. 1988) ("[Tihe bank-
ruptcy court must focus ultimately on the fair market value as affected by the fact of
foreclosure.").
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for determining the effects of the foreclosure on the property's value.147 The
fact that a foreclosure price cannot reflect actual value undermines the appar-
ent simplicity of this analysis. 48 A number of factors significantly diminish
the probative value of the foreclosure price. In the vast majority of cases, the
single bidder at a foreclosure sale will be the lender." 9 In these cases, the
lender generally will bid no higher than the debt owed it and will receive the
property for the amount of the unpaid loan.' In the event that a third-party
appears and bids for the property, the lender will only maintain competitive
bidding up to the amount of the loan. 5'
. Additional factors discourage third-parties from vigorously pursuing the
property through higher bids. Typically, foreclosure sales require cash pay-
ment. 52 Also, an auctioneer, rather than a qualified broker, conducts the
sale.' 53 Moreover, the doubt that clouds the title to the property and the possi-
bility that a court might later set aside the sale tend to dampen aggressive
bidding. 15'
State law recognizes the weak evidence of value that foreclosure prices pro-
vide and will not give presumptive weight to these prices in certain areas of
law.' 5 These elements indicate that the value paid for the debtor's interest in
the property is often significantly depressed and that foreclosure sales do not
achieve a fair, let alone a reasonable, price for that interest.'56 Consequently,
Bundles posed the wrong question when the court looked solely to the value
paid. There is no need to know what effect the foreclosure sale had on the
property's value. The statutory question that must be answered before a trans-
fer may be set aside under section 548 is whether the debtor received reasona-
bly equivalent value for his interest in the property. 5 7
The direct link between value and interest is inherent in the statute's lan-
guage, though every court applying the section has failed to see it. Section 548
provides that: "The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor
in property .. .5 if the debtor voluntarily or involuntarily received less than
147. Id.
148. See supra notes 95-100 and accompanying text.
149. Henning, supra note 24, at 273..
150. Note, Mortgage Foreclosure Sales, supra note I1, at 1247 (citing Lifton, Real Estate in
Trouble: Lender's Remedies Need an Overhaul, 31 Bus. LAW, 1927, 1937 (1976) and R.
KRAVOTH & R. WERNER, MODERN MORTGAGE LAW AND PRACTICE § 41.02 (2d ed. 1981)); see
also Henning, supra note 24, at 273-74 (stating that the procedures governing mortgage foreclo-
sures usually result in the debtor's equity being sacrificed).
151. Henning, supra note 24, at 273.
152. Id. at 274.
153. Id.
154. See id.
155. See Gillman v. Preston Family Inv. Co. (In re Richardson) 23 Bankr. 434, 446-47 & n.18
(Bankr. D. Utah 1982) (making specific references to anti-deficiency legislation and valuation for
tax purposes).
156. See supra note 93 and accompanying text; supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text.
157. II U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A) (1988).
158. Id. § 548(a).
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a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such transfer ... -159 The
broad definition of "transfer" allows courts to read the statute as stating that
the trustee may set aside any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property
if the debtor did not receive reasonably equivalent value. The statute requires
the examination of the value received to be conducted in a vacuum, disregard-
ing the circumstances surrounding the sale."O The use of "voluntarily or invol-
untarily" in section 548(a) illustrates that the nature of the transaction is ir-
relevant. 6 The debtor must receive reasonable equivalence for his property
interest regardless of how the transfer was initiated or conducted.
The Seventh Circuit erred by relating the foreclosure sale price to reasona-
ble value. Significant factors affect the prices paid at a foreclosure sale. The
foreclosure sale price, however, bears no relation to the debtor's interest in the
property. In applying section 548(a)(2)(A), the courts must use a definition of
reasonably equivalent value that reflects the debtor's interest in the property.
III. A PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO SECTION 548 OF THE BANKRUPTCY
CODE
The three different applications of reasonably equivalent value have created
substantial confusion and undermined the finality of foreclosure sales. Judicial
attempts to satisfy three different interests within an undefined criterion for
value have created these difficulties. The secured lender strives to recover as
much of its loan as possible. The third-party purchaser seeks to pay the lowest
possible price to gain clear title to the property. The debtor/trustee wishes to
get the best possible price for the property in order to offset all outstanding
debts and rehabilitate the debtor. To maximize the satisfaction of each of
these divergent interests and gain continuity within bankruptcy court deci-
sions, Congress should amend section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code to provide a
definition of "reasonably equivalent value.""62
The proposed amendment to section 548(d)(2) would shift the emphasis
from fair market 'value to the debtor's basis in the property. 63 Bundles pro-
vides the rationale for rejecting Madrid.'6" Additionally, the inability to
achieve a fair market value in the foreclosure on appreciated property necessi-
tates rebuffing the Durrett rule and focusing on the debtor's basis in the
159. Id. §, 548(a)(2)(A).
160. See text of II U.S.C. § 548(a) at supra note 6.
161. See II U.S.C. § 548(a) (1988).
162. The Bankruptcy Code fails to provide a definition for "reasonably equivalent value," and
the legislative history provides no support for a fixed determination. See id. § 548; S. REP. No.
989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5787, 5787.
163. The definition of "basis" is found in 26 U.S.C. § 1012 (1988). The other provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code will apply whenever this general definition is not applicable: § 1014 for
property acquired from a decedent; § 1015 for property acquired by gifts and transfers or in trust;
and § 1016 when changes in the property require the basis to be adjusted.
164. See supra notes 109-22 and accompanying text (discussing the Bundles court's rejection of
Madrid).
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A. Proposed Amendment to Section 548(d)(2)
Congress should adopt the following proposed language to amend section
548(d)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code:
(2) In this section-
(D) "reasonably equivalent value" shall be defined as follows for all non-
judicial foreclosures, judicial foreclosures, strict foreclosures and execution
sales.
(i) Where the value of the real property has appreciated since its original
purchase, reasonably equivalent value will be given when the amount given
matches or exceeds the individual's "basis" in the property. The determina-
tion of basis shall be consistent with the statutory definition in the Internal
Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 1012, 1014-16 (1982 & Supp. 1988). An accu-
rate calculation of the individual's basis in the property must be made avail-
able at the time of the foreclosure sale.
(ii) Where the value of the real property has depreciated since its original
purchase, reasonably equivalent value will be given when the amount given
matches or exceeds the property's fair market value. The average of three
independent appraisals of the property's value, or a stipulation signed at the
time of the transfer by all involved parties, will reflect the fair market value
of the property.
B. Advantages of Defining Reasonably Equivalent Value in Terms of
Basis
Equity dictates using the debtor's basis in her property to define reasonably
equivalent value. The acquisition of the property, plus any improvement to the
property, measures every individual's ownership of the property. 66 Initially,
the basis offers the best reflection of the debtor's interest in the property. The
basis consists of what the individual paid for the property, plus any improve-
ments to the property consistent with section 1016 of the Internal Revenue
Code. 7 Equity demands that the debtor recover what she has paid when a
165. See supra note 93 and accompanying text; supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text.
The same problem of foreclosure sales' inability to attract true fair market value, however, is not
as significant for the sale of depreciated property.
166. J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT (P. Laslett rev. ed. 1963) (3rd
ed. 1698). This treatise further states:
The labour of his body and the work of his hands we may say are properly his. What-
soever, then, he removes out of the state that nature hath provided and left it in, he
hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby
makes it his property.
Id. § 27.
167. An individual's basis in property, generally, is the cost of the property. 26 U.S.C. § 1012
(1988). The individual will not realize any appreciation or depreciation in the property value,
excepting adjustments under 26 U.S.C. § 1016, until she transfers the property to another
individual.
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foreclosure sale occurs. 168
The proposed definition of reasonably equivalent value specifically rejects
any consideration of property value appreciation. No actual appreciation in
value is realized, and is purely hypothetical and speculative, until the property
is sold. This created value is isolated from any cost the property owner incurs,
and consequently, tle debtor has no equitable interest in the appreciated value
of the property. At a foreclosure sale, the debtor should be guaranteed full
recovery on what she has paid."' The proposed definition establishes a bidding
floor that achieves this goal.
Defining reasonably equivalent value in terms of basis fixes a single, prede-
termined figure for the value. The Internal Revenue Code calculates the indi-
vidual's basis in the property at the time of the purchase.17 0 This value will
not, in the case of real property, undergo any subsequent fluctuations.' 7 ' Link-
ing the debtor's basis in the property with reasonably equivalent value will
guarantee the creditor's loan up to a pre-existing figure. An example is illus-
trative of this point. Suppose a debtor owns a house with a fair market value
of $150,000. She originally purchased the home for $100,000, and it is listed
as collateral for $70,000 in secured loans. Under this scenario, a subsequent
lender will know that he may loan up to an additional $30,000 and remain
confident that he will recover the money should the borrower default on the
loan.
This fixed figure also provides peace of mind to the property's third-party
purchaser. At the time of the foreclosure sale, the purchaser will know or will
be informed of the debtor's basis in the property. 7 2 So long as the third-party
purchaser's bid exceeds the basis, $100,000 in the example above, the debtor
or trustee will be unable to set aside the sale under section 548(a)(2), as
amended, and there will be no question regarding the title to the property.
Finally, a direct correlation between basis and the value in the property
benefits the debtor. Initially, the figure should serve as a loan ceiling and
should help restrict individual debt problems. If the individual limits her bor-
rowing within this figure, she always will be assured of starting from a rela-
Young Laertes has a basis of $160,000 in his Elsinore Heights home. For federal income tax
purposes, property appreciation has not affected this basis because Laertes has yet to realize this
increase in value. This same argument can be used to anchor Laertes' interest in the property with
his basis rather than allowing it to fluctuate with the real estate market.
168. See Bundles v. Baker (In re Bundles), 856 F.2d 815, 824 (7th Cir. 1988).
169. See supra note 151 (demonstrating how the proposal encourages the early sale of appreci-
ated property).
170. 26 U.S.C. § 1012 (1988).
171. While an individual's basis in her property might change, it will not be exposed to the wild
fluctuations seen in a property's fair market value. 26 U.S.C. § 1016 details each action that will
result in an adjustment of basis. Depreciation or property improvement values can be calculated
with relative ease; certainly, in any case, in comparison to land appraisals.
172. If this amendment is adopted, documents certifying the debtor's basis in the property
would have to be available prior to the foreclosure sale. The debtor will bear the responsibility for
providing such documentation.
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tively clean slate because the foreclosure price will cover secured debts. 173
Correlating basis and reasonable equivalence also assists the debtor because
it should increase the sale price of her property under any circumstance. The
debtor will face three situations: the fair market value will exceed her basis
(appreciated property), her basis will exceed the property's fair market value
(depreciated property), or the values will be relatively close. The correlation
will encourage the debtor to sell either appreciated or depreciated property as
soon as possible because allowing foreclosure will result in significant economic
loss. 17 1 Consequently, foreclosed property should have a fair market value
closely equivalent to the basis in the property. This, -in turn, produces a fore-
closure sale price more equitable to the debtor. In each circumstance, the pro-
posed definition of reasonably equivalent value prompts the debtor towards
quick action, resulting in a maximization of return on the sale and allowing
173. It is inevitable that some individuals will continue to borrow beyond their means. Having a
fixed definition, however, should help decrease the number of people who borrow beyond their
means. Suppose Laertes, before defaulting on his mortgage, went to Fortinbras at the Norwegian
Savings & Loan to borrow $150,000. Laertes would believe himself capable of covering this
amount with collateral. After all, he has a home valued at $325,000 and only $100,000 in out-
standing debt. Clearly, he believes, he could borrow another $225,000 and cover these loans with
his home.
Fortinbras would then explain the realities of default and foreclosure sales to Laertes. Should
Laertes default, he will never be able to recover the full value of his house. Fortinbras, under the
proposed amendment, would be able to loan Laertes $60,000 (the difference between Laertes'
basis in the property and the amount in loans secured by the home). This figure sets an upward
limit for the borrower which he can reach without subjecting himself to any risk other than the
loss of his home. If he defaults and the property is sold through a foreclosure sale, the borrower
knows that he will be able to meet his debts based upon the sale price. Laertes, under the pro-
posed definition, knows that he is guaranteed $160,000 for his home at a foreclosure sale. The
proceeds fiom the sale will be immediately handed over to his creditors, and he moves his posses-
sions into the moving van and reestablishes himself in a $400 per month apartment in Bayonne.
He is free of debt.
Imagine that the Norwegian Savings & Loan does lend Laertes the $150,000. Both parties
know that only $60,000 is guaranteed in a foreclosure. The remaining $90,000 would be a high
risk loan. It might be possible to secure this remaining amount through other items Laertes owns.
But these other pieces of collateral, such as Laertes' car, also come under Article 9 of the state's
Commercial Code and the bank would have to join the line of secured creditors. If the bank has
relied solely on its perception of the property's fair market value, it will be forced to bid beyond
Laertes' basis in the property. When lenders go beyond the basis in loans, the result will be a
slightly more competitive bidding procedure at the foreclosure sale as lenders bid up the price over
the basis to insure that they recover on their loans.
174. The predetermined foreclosure floor offers a strong inducement to sell appreciated prop-
erty early. Imagine that Ophelia purchased a home in Willow Brook in 1968. The property appre-
ciates in value from $40,000 to $200,000 over the subsequent twenty-two years. If Ophelia now
faces default and foreclosure, the effects of the proposed amendment strongly promote early sale.
She is guaranteed only 20% of the property's value if she postpones acting and foreclosure occurs.
Conversely, prompt action insures the best possible recovery for her. Even if the asking price for
the house is lowered to speed the sale, the selling price should still exceed any foreclosure sale
price.
Likewise, under the proposed definition, the debtor is encouraged to sell property as soon as
possible in the event of depreciation in order to mitigate her losses.
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for the payment of debts. This provides the best economic result for the debtor
and also, coincidentally, preserves federal interests. 75
This amendment also offers advantages over the case-by-case approach. By
setting a clear floor for the value received, most foreclosure sales will not re-
quire judicial review. This approach directly contrasts with the case-by-case
analysis, which is fact specific and could require a full review of each detail of
every foreclosure.' 76
The proposed amendment promotes judicial efficiency; Bundles encourages
trustees to assert a section 548 challenge to all foreclosure sales. A consistent
definition for reasonably equivalent value substantially diminishes such chal-
lenges. Each involved party will know at the time of the sale whether the final
sale price constituted reasonable equivalence. This knowledge should eliminate
nearly all claims based on section 548(a)(2) in all foreclosure and execution
sales.
Economic realities require a two-part definition of reasonably equivalent
value. The proposed definition recognizes that the economic realities signifi-
cantly differ, depending on whether the value of the property has appreciated
or depreciated. In contrast to the proposed definition, an absolute recovery of
basis rule would prevent the purchase of depreciated property at a foreclosure
auction.' 77 The proposed definition acknowledges the rare instances of prop-
erty value depreciation and attempts to maximize each party's interests. The
proposed amendment establishes an acknowledged figure for the property's
fair market value at the time of the foreclosure sale. The third-party pur-
chaser, given that she pays this amount, benefits because she takes the prop-
erty free of a potential section 548 set aside. The proposal also advances the
debtor's direct and related interests. The debtor/trustee's right to equitable
recovery, complemented by the federal government's interests, mandates this
definition of reasonably equivalent value.' The debtor's equitable interest in
the property is her basis.' 79 If the property has depreciated in value, a full
recovery of the fair market value returns the debtor to the point closest to her
basis. This, in turn, maximizes the distribution of her assets to her creditors.'
175. See supra notes 126-30 and accompanying text (discussing the federal interest sought to
be protected under the Bankruptcy Code).
176. See, e.g., Gillman v. Preston Family Inv. Co. (In re Richardson), 23 Bankr. 434, 448
(Bankr. D. Utah 1982) (advocating the application of a case-by-case determination by the court
of reasonably equivalent value).
177. An example demonstrates the problem with such a requirement. The debtor borrowed $2
million to purchase a large ranch outside of Houston, Texas in 1982 for $2.5 million. Six years
later the debtor has watched the oil market collapse, his cattle die from disease, and the local real
estate market crash. His property is now worth $1 million, and he is broke. No one would match
his basis at a foreclosure sale. The property's fair market value is 40% of his basis.
178. See supra notes 126-30 and accompanying text.
179. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
180. The single § 548 case involving depreciated property supports the proposal's advocacy of
full fair market value recovery. See First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Hulm, (In re Hulm), 45
Bankr. 523 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1984) In In re Hulm, the court acknowledged that "the best method
of determining whether a price constitutes a reasonably equivalent value is simply to compare the
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Section (2)(D)(ii) of the proposed amendment places a burden on the lend-
ers, since they may be forced to pay more for the debtor's property than the
amount of the loan. 18' Property depreciation imposes a burden that the lender
is best suited to accept. The creditor had the advance opportunity to examine
the loan application and determine the appropriateness of the loan. Because
the lender has miscalculated the risk, it is rational for it to bear the cost of
that error. This application of the proposed definition will be rare.'" Addition-
ally, the burden is reasonable because the creditor need only meet the current
value of the property.
IV. CONCLUSION
Though it specifically rejected both Durrett and Madrid, the Bundles
court's analytical test does not offer a new solution. The Seventh Circuit rec-
ognized the federal right of review independent of state law and carefully illus-
trated the statutory inconsistencies in the Madrid presumption. Unfortunately,
the appellate court failed to employ these observations when the court adopted
a case-by-case analysis that strongly favors the price received at the foreclo-
sure sale. The Bundles test, furthermore, associates the circumstances sur-
rounding the transfer with the received value, and consequently, continues the
misapplication of section 548(a)(2)(A).
The inconsistent results in the application of section 548(a)(2)(A) of the
Bankruptcy Code come from the perception that the foreclosure sale price
must relate to the property's fair market value. This Article suggests that
courts should follow a plain meaning application of section 548(a)(2)(A). Fur-
ther, reasonably equivalent value should be defined in terms of the debtor's
basis in real property, as opposed to focusing on the fair market value. These
recommendations should help to clarify the meaning of reasonably equivalent
purchase price to the fair market value existing at the time of the sale." Id. at 529
Admittedly, this is a generous reading of the case because neither the extent of the property's
depreciation nor its value in relation to the debtor's basis is known. The debtor's basis in the
property is not specified. Nine months before the foreclosure sale, the property was appraised at
$123,100, but it was transferred at a bid price of $64,443.64. Id. The property was subsequently
resold for $95,000. Id. at 526. The court, however, indicated that its assessed fair market value of
$100,000 was "due to the pending foreclosure sale" and not the decline of property values in the
region. Id. at 527.
181. This burden will be imposed only if the fair market value of the property is greater than
the amount of the outstanding mortgage. Under the current definitions of reasonably equivalent
value, lenders seek only to recover the amount they are owed. Consequently, lenders normally bid
only this amount, even if it is less than the fair market value. In contrast, under the proposed
definition the lender cannot tie his bid to the amount owed if it is less than fair market value. The
requirement of reasonable equivalence will not be satisfied, and the transfer can be set aside.
Lenders are thus forced to bid fair market value even where it exceeds the amount of the loan.
Note that no such burden is imposed on the lender if the mortgage exceeds the fair market
value. The lender will bid the amount of the mortgage, thus automatically satisfying the require-
ment of reasonably equivalent value under the proposed definition.
182. See supra notes 177 & 180.
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value. Ultimately, this should result in a uniform and coherent judicial appli-
cation of section 548(a)(2)(A).

